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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992) which
provides:
including

"The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over,

(i)appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but
division,

not

child

limited

custody,

to, divorce, annulment, property

support,

paternity . . . ."

1

visitation,

adoption, and

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering the

Husband to maintain his Civil Service Survivor Benefits and life
insurance in favor of the Wife where the record reflected a clear
and uncontroverted agreement that he would do so?

The standard of

review requires this court to uphold the trial court order absent
a showing of an abuse of discretion. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790
P.2d 57, 61 (Utah App. 1990).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by modifying the

decree of divorce to correct a clerical error omitting reference to
maintenance of Husband's life insurance policy/survivor benefits?
The standard of review requires the court to uphold the trial court
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.

Lindsay v. Atkin, 680

P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984).
3.

Did the trial

court properly

order the Husband to

maintain a Civil Service Survivor Benefits and life insurance
policy naming the Wife as the beneficiary?

The standard of review

requires the court to uphold the trial court absent a showing of an
abuse of discretion.

Whitehead v. Whitehead. 836 P. 2d 814, 816

(Utah App. 1992) .
4.

Wife should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs of

court in defending this appeal.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(a):
Clerical mistakes.
Clerical mistakes in judgments,
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time of its own initiative or on the
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the
court orders.
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION Rule 4-501(3)(a)-

Hearings. (a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or
requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b)
. . • below, (b) In cases where the granting of a motion
would dispose of the action or any issues in the action
on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of
filing the principal memorandum in support of or in
opposition to a motion may file a written request for a
hearing. (c) Such request shall be granted unless the
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the
motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or
set of issues governing the granting or denial of the
motion has been authoritatively decided.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties tried this divorce case before Judge Richard H.
Moffat in the Third District Court for Tooele County on November
13, 1991. The parties had been married in 1960, and were ending a
marriage of over 30 (thirty) years. The marriage was a traditional
marriage in which the Husband was the wage earner and the Defendant
was a homemaker.

During the trial Verna Labadie,

("Wife"),

testified that she desired David Labadie ("Husband) to maintain his
life insurance policy with her as the beneficiary.

When asked,

Husband indicated he had no objection to Wife's wishes. When Judge
Moffat entered the divorce Wife's counsel reminded Judge Moffat of
the agreement between the parties to maintain the life insurance
policy.

Judge Moffat acknowledged this agreement.

Husband's

counsel then asked to address attorneys' fees and did not return to
a discussion of the life insurance issue.

Husband's counsel

drafted the final decree, which was submitted to Wife's counsel for
approval as to form and entered by Judge Moffat on December 11,
1992.
Shortly after Judge Moffat entered the order Wife's counsel
discovered that Husband's counsel omitted the provision ordering
Husband to maintain his life insurance policy.

Wife's counsel

notified Husband's counsel and requested the preparation of an
amended decree including the Survivor Benefits provision. Husband
4

did not respond.

Wife then filed a motion to amend the decree

pursuant to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501.
Wife based this motion on UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(a) which allows for
correction of clerical mistakes in judicial orders. Neither party
sought a hearing on the motion. Judge David S. Young found Wife's
request to be consistent with the stipulation the parties made in
court and granted Wife's motion on October 28, 1993.

Husband

sought a hearing for reconsideration of Judge Young's motion which
the court denied.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Husband's agreement to maintain his life insurance policy in
favor of the Wife is clear and uncontroverted in the record and
supports Judge Young's order. Furthermore, the court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Husband's motion for a hearing for
reconsideration

where

the

court

authoritatively

decided

the

dispositive issue.
The court did not violate res judicata principles by granting
Wife's motion to amend the decree. Rather, the court complied with
the requirements of UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(a) which allows the court to
correct clerical errors.
Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering
the Husband to maintain his life insurance policy where the parties
5

stipulated that Husband would do so and the order is consistent
with available precedent.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING
TO PROVIDE DETAILED FINDINGS AND GRANT A HEARING ON
HUSBAND'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
A.

The Court Need Not Enter Detailed Findings Where
the Record is Clear and Uncontroverted.

The trial court's decision to amend the decree of divorce
without a detailed statement of findings and reasons was not an
abuse of discretion. Wife concedes that findings are required when
a

court

modifies

circumstances.

a

divorce

decree

based

on

a

change

of

Nonetheless, findings are not necessary when the

court bases its order on the clear facts in the record.

The Utah

Court of Appeals in Whitehouse stated, "[T]he trial court must make
findings on all material issues, . . . unless the facts in the
record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment."
790 P.2d at 61 (emphasis added) (citing Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 737
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987), and Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)) .
In Whitehouse, the plaintiff

sought to amend a decree of

divorce because of a change of circumstances.

Principally, the

plaintiff

interest

sought

to

setoff

the
6

defendant's

in

the

plaintiff's retirement account against the plaintiff's interest in
the marital home. The plaintiff also sought to end his alimony and
child support payments. The defendant countered, asking the court
for an immediate payment of her share of the retirement benefits.
The court granted the plaintiff's request, effectively denying the
defendant's request.

790 P. 2d at 59.

On appeal, the court

emphasized that the "findings of the court were directed to its
order terminating the child support and alimony provisions of the
decree, not to a modification of the home equity or retirement
provisions."

Id. at 61. Thus, the court found that the findings

were not sufficiently related to the retirement and home equity
issues and concluded that the trial court must have based its
decision on something else.

Id. at 62.

The presence of a clear agreement in the record between
Husband and Wife distinguishes this case from Whitehouse.

During

the trial the following exchange took place between Husband and
Wife's counsel:

Counsel:
"Do you have any objection to maintaining
Mrs. LaBadie as the beneficiary of your life insurance?"
Husband:

"I have to, yes."

Counsel:

"Pardon Me?"

Husband:

"Yes, I was ordered by the court to do that."

7

Counsel:
the divorce.
Husband:

"I'm talking about continuing that after
Do you have—?"

"Yes."

Counsel:
her?"
Husband:

"Do you have any objection to continuing
"No."

(TR, p. 19).
The exchange between Husband and Wife's counsel indicates an
uncontroverted stipulation between the parties on the issue of
insurance.

Unlike in Whitehouse, where the trial court tried to

base its decision on unrelated findings, the order amending the
decree

and

inserting

the

insurance provision

refers to this

agreement and "finds the amendment to be consistent with the
stipulation in court."
added).

Minute Entry, October 28, 1992 (emphasis

Given the clarity of the record, the law does not require

further findings in this case.
B.

Husband Was Not Entitled to a Hearing On His Motion
to Reconsider Because the Issue of Whether the
Parties
Agreed
on
the
Insurance
Provision
Authoritatively Decided.

The Court did

not abuse

its discretion

by denying

the

Husband's motion for a hearing on his motion for reconsideration.
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION Rule 4-501(3)(c) allows the

court to deny a request for a hearing where "the court finds that
8

(a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that
the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or
denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided."
The Husband based his motion to reconsider on the lack of
findings.

As discussed

above, extensive

findings

were not

necessary in this case because of the clear expression of the
parties agreement in the record.
the

issues

governing

reconsideration

were

the

It logically follows, then, that

denial

the

authoritatively

Husband's

decided.

motion

for

Furthermore,

Husband's motion to reconsider was frivolous where the judge
expressed precise findings based on a clear agreement in his order.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
MODIFIED THE DECREE TO REFLECT THE PARTIES AGREEMENT.

The order modifying the decree to include the life insurance
provision corrected a clerical error excluding the provision from
the original decree.

UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(a) provides:

"Clerical

mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected
by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders."
In Stanaer v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co.. 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah
1983), the Utah Supreme Court explained that trial courts have
discretion to freely correct formal errors.
9

The Stanaer court

discovered an error in computing the figure used to determine
damages for commissions due to the plaintiff.

Id. at 1204.

The

Supreme Court revised the damages award upward to correct the
mistake, and defined clerical mistakes stating:

"'It is a type of

mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the
record and which does not involve a legal decision or judgment by
an attorney./fI

Id. at 1206 (quoting In Re Merry Queen Transfer

Corp., 266 F.Supp. 605, 607 (1967)).

The Stanaer court further

explained that

"it matters little whether an error was made by the court
clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party or the judge
himself, so long as it is clearly a formal error that
should be corrected in the interests of having judgment,
order, or other part of the record reflect what was done
or intended."
Id. See also Lindsay, 680 P.2d at 402 ("The distinction between a
judicial error and a clerical error does not depend upon who made
it.

Rather it depends on whether it was made in rendering the

judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered."

(quoting

Richards v. Siddowav. 24 Utah 2d 314, 317, 471 P. 2d 143, 145
119ZQ)).
The absence of any reference to Husband's life insurance
policy in the final decree of divorce was a clerical mistake.

As

discussed, supra, Husband agreed to maintain his life insurance
10

policy for Wife's benefit during his testimony.

Furthermore,

Husband's counsel was aware of this stipulation as evidenced by the
following exchange at trial.
"Well, I will grant joint divorces,
The Court:
one against the other. Did she file a counterclaim?"
Wife's Counsel:
"She did, your Honor, and she made a
request the divorce be final in '92 and he has already
agreed to maintain her on his survivor benefits and so
the only other issue would be the attorneys fees issue.
Husband's Counsel:
insurance?11

"You

Wife's Counsel:
maintain it."

"Yeah.

Husband's Counsel:
fees?"

"Could I address that, on attorneys

The Court:

are

talking

about

life

He said he was agreeable to

"You may."

(TR. p. 89).
The hesitancy in Husband's counsel's request, as indicated by the
comma in the sentence "[c]ould I address that, on attorneys fees?"
suggests Husband's counsel did not want to talk about the life
insurance policy at all. Instead, he was thinking about attorneys
fees and was distracted when Wife's counsel mentioned the life
insurance

agreement.

The

fact

that

Husband's

counsel

then

continued to discuss attorneys fees without any mention of life
insurance supports this conclusion. Judge Moffat had no reason to

11

believe that Husband's counsel opposed the life insurance under
these circumstances.
The record is clear. The parties agreed on the Civil Service
Survivor benefits and Husband's counsel was aware of the agreement.
The order modifying the decree was correct, where, "the mistake is
clear from the record [and] reflects no more than what the [Wife
is] entitled to." Stanger, 669 P.2d at 1207 (citing Fay v. Harris.
64 Ariz. 10, 164 P.2d 860 (1945)).
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING
HUSBAND TO MAINTAIN HIS LIFE INSURANCE POLICY/SURVIVOR
BENEFITS WITH WIFE AS THE BENEFICIARY
The order requiring Husband to maintain his life insurance
policy or survivor benefits was within the discretion of the trial
court and was supported by adequate legal precedent. "Trial courts
may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters so long as the
decision is within the confines of legal precedence."

Whitehead,

836 P.2d at 816 (citing Cumminas v. Cumminas. 821 P.2d 472, 474-74
(Utah App. 1991); Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah App.
1990); and Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App. 1991)).
Whether a trial court can order a spouse to maintain a life
insurance policy for the benefit of a former spouse is a matter of
first impression before this court. Husband cites Menor v. Menor.
391 P.2d

473 (Colo. 1964) as the leading case on the issue.
12

Colorado, however, has since revised its statutes to allow judges
to include provisions requiring on party to maintain a life
insurance policy benefitting a former spouse.

See In Re Marriage

of Koktavy, 612 P. 2d 1161, 1162 (Colo. App. 1980) (holding that
COLO. REV. STAT. Section 14-10-122(2) (1973) changed prior law to
allow the court to order maintenance of life insurance).

Many

other jurisdictions allow the court to order a party to maintain
life insurance in favor of a former spouse. See generally John J.
Michalik, Annotation, Divorce: Provisions in Decree That One Party
Obtain or Maintain Life Insurance For Benefit of Other Party or
Child, 59 A.L.R. 9 (1974).

In Gallo v. Gallo, 440 A.2d 782 (Conn.

1981), the trial court ordered the defendant to purchase a life
insurance policy with the plaintiff named as the beneficiary. The
court explained:

"Such and order is well within the inherent

equitable power of the court in a dissolution proceeding."

Id. at

788 (citing Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 585, 362
A.2d 835 (1975); and Thomas v. Thomas. 158 Conn. 477, 482-483, 271
A.2d 62 (1970)).

In response to the argument that life insurance

policies represent an improper award of alimony continuing after
the payor's death the court stated:

"Insurance premiums are paid

during a decedent's lifetime and the proceeds flow directly to the
beneficiary. This is not analogous to a claim of continued payment
of periodic alimony from the estate of the deceased ex-spouse."
13

Id, (citing Harrison v. Union & New Haven trust Co,. 147 Conn. 435,
437, 162 A.2d 182 (1960) ) . See also Robbins v. Robbins. 453 N.E.2d
1059, 1060 (Mass. App. 1983) ("It was within the judge's discretion
to require the defendant to maintain a life insurance policy for
the plaintiff's benefit."); and Moebus v. Moebus. 529 So.2d 1163
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming judgment ordering the husband
to maintain a life insurance policy in favor of the wife to protect
the wife's alimony).

Colorado's courts have found that the health

of the party ordered to pay spousal support is relevant to a
decision ordering the party to maintain life insurance in favor of
the former spouse.

Koktavy, 612 P.2d at 1162.

Even jurisdictions which disapprove of orders forcing the
party to provide life insurance allow the parties to include a life
insurance provision in their decree where the parties have agreed
on the issue.

The Menor court, when overruling an order forcing

the husband to provide a life insurance policy in favor of his exwife stated, "This situation is clearly distinguishable from those
cases in which the parties to a divorce action have settled their
property rights by contract, the terms of which are incorporated in
the decree."

391 P.2d at 477. See also Koktavy, 612 P.2d at 1162

(explaining that Colorado law allows parties to agree in writing
that maintenance will continue after death).

14

The trial court's order conforms to the precedent outlined
above.

First, the parties agreed that Husband would maintain his

life insurance. This agreement was not an agreement in writing, as
required in Colorado, but was included in the record of the trial
court.

Second, there is significant support suggesting that

maintaining Wife as the beneficiary of Husband's life insurance
policy is not post mortem alimony. Third, as Husband admits, he is
in poor health and the life insurance policy is an appropriate
method to secure the alimony awarded to Wife. The trial court was
well within its broad discretion when it approved Wife's motion and
ordered Husband to maintain his life insurance policy with Wife as
the named beneficiary.
IV. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST ON APPEAL
Wife should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs of court
in defending this appeal. The parties were divorced by an Amended
Decree of Divorce and Amended Findings, entered on October 28,
1992, after having been married 3 2 (thirty-two) years. The parties
had three children and the Wife was a homemaker during the entire
marriage and relied upon the Husband for her support and the
support of the family.

15

Wife,

the

Appellee

herein,

cannot

afford

the

costs

and

attorney's fees in defending the instant appeal and respectfully
requests an award of fees and costs on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Trial

courts

have broad

discretionary

powers

in

divorce

matters. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case
where the record clearly indicated a stipulation between Husband
and Wife that Husband would maintain his life

insurance/Civil

Survivor benefits with Wife as the beneficiary.

The trial court

was also well within its discretion when it modified the decree to
correct a clerical error.
its

discretion

benefits

where

by

Finally, the trial court did not abuse

ordering

significant

supports the order.

Husband
precedent

to

maintain

from

other

the

survivor

jurisdictions

For these reasons Wife respectfully requests

that this court uphold the Third Judicial District Court's order
requiring Husband to maintain the Civil Survivor benefits with Wife
as the sole beneficiary and that the Wife be awarded her attorney's
fees and all costs on appeal.
/ 7^7X

Respectfully submitted this

&*¥ o f April, 1993

CELLIE F. WILLIAMS
Attorney for Defendant/Wife
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